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Abstract:
This article analyzes the clusters of similarities among EU member states before and during  
the recent financial and debt crisis, using variables from banking, taxation, government debt  
and deficit,  and the  Current  Account  of  the Balance  of  Payment;  our study follows the  
method  of  Multi-Sample  Case  of  Cluster  Analysis  between  and  within  groups  of  EU  
countries. Our findings show that the current economic crisis the EU is faced with is two-
faceted and has arisen from the financial and banking sectors and from government debt. In  
this sense, problems have resulted from the credit policies of the national banking sectors  
and from national fiscal and budgetary controls. These two crisis facets are correlated and a  
new  problem  emerges  concerning  the  fiscal  similarities  of  European  Monetary  Union  
(EMU) countries and the necessity for a fiscal union or for common fiscal policies between  
them. The aim of this article is to help us understand that the current EU crisis is due to the  
lack of homogeneity in fiscal and financial polishes across the Union.   
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1. Introduction
Herman  Van  Rompuy  argues  that  “the  Eurozone  will  in  the  near  future  most 
probably  retain  its  unique  character  of  a  monetary  union  in  which  fiscal  policy 
remains in the hands of the Member States. The overall goal, therefore, has to be to 
make Member States more mindful of their responsibilities towards themselves and 
the other members of the club. The action —or lack of action— of one affects all.”  
(European View, 2010).
On the other hand, Stuckler et al. (2010) advocate that reducing government deficits 
is, in principle, simple - cut costs or free up money. Governments should always 
spend  money  efficiently,  but  there  are  also  at  least  five  ways  to  increase  their  
finances.  One  short-term  measure  is  the  sale  of  government  assets  (i.e. 
privatization); alternatively, governments can stimulate the economy by increasing 
the money supply; a third option is to borrow more money; a fourth option is to 
increase  taxes;  the  final  option,  adopted  by  any  government,  is  to  cut  public 
spending.
Before the debt crisis started the spread of each EU country, 10 years government  
bond  against  Germans  correspondently,  are  not  strongly  correlated  with  index 
government debt to GDP. According to Simone Manganelli and Guido Wolswijk 
(2009),  in  the  run-up  to  the  European  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU), 
interest rate spreads of the euro-area 10-year government bonds against the German 
benchmark  have  declined  dramatically.  The  decline  reflected  mainly  the 
introduction  of  the  euro  and  the  subsequent  removal  of  exchange  rate  risks. 
However, developments in spreads after that are more puzzling. Developments in  
the fiscal positions of euro-area governments seem, at first  sight,  to offer only a 
limited explanation for this. In the work of Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003), 
movements  in  yield  differentials  on  euro-zone  government  bonds  are  mostly 
explained by changes in international risk factors, as measured by US swap and 
corporate  bond  spreads  relative  to  the  US  Treasury  yields.  These  international 
factors affect spreads because they change the perceived default risk of government 
bonds in the euro zone. Liquidity factors play a less significant role, though. The 
impact  of  international  risk  on  yield  differentials  in  Austria,  Italy  and Spain,  is 
explained by their debt-to-GDP ratios relative to Germany. Default risk explains a 
substantial part of changes in yield spreads in Italy and Spain. Yield differentials for  
all  the other countries are also significantly affected by international risk factors,  
although independently from debt-to-GDP ratios. This suggests that bonds issued by 
these countries are viewed as imperfect substitutes of German bonds for reasons not 
related  to  their  debt  ratios.  International  risk  may  have  an  impact  because  of 
differences in liquidity but also because of unobservable fundamentals, such as the 
reputation of the issuing government,  or because of greater  uncertainty of future 
budget surpluses. Greater trading volumes significantly reduce yield differentials in 
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France, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain, while other traditional indicators, such 
as bid-ask spreads, have no effect. Even in such countries, however, international  
risk-related factors appear the main source of variation in yield differentials. France 
is the only country where liquidity matters more than international risk. Finland and 
Ireland, the two countries with the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio, also show no reaction 
to  international  risk  factors.  Yields  on  euro-zone  government  bonds  have  been 
increasingly correlated across issuers. This is a sign of enhanced integration that is 
explained by the common denomination in euro. However, additional policy steps to 
increase  financial  market  integration  by  means  of  increased  efficiency  both  in 
primary and secondary markets, although desirable, would not deliver a ‘seamless’  
bond market in the euro area. 
The  risk  of  default,  though  small,  remains  an  important  factor  explaining 
movements  in  yield  differentials.  This  evidence  points  to  incomplete  fiscal 
consolidation and to the need for further convergence of debt-to-GDP ratios. In this 
process,  yield  differentials  would  be  important  policy  indicators,  as  they  would 
signal  market  perception  of  fiscal  vulnerability.  Furthermore,  since  higher  bond 
yields  imply  higher  debt  service  costs,  yield  differentials  reflecting  default  risk 
impose market discipline on fiscal policies of the national governments within the 
euro zone. Although such a role now appears somewhat reduced compared to the 
pre-EMU period, also because of the limited changes currently observed in budget 
deficits, it is likely that the risk component of bond yields would continue to work as 
a deterrent for irresponsible fiscal policies if such policies were ever implemented.
Wyplosz (2006) notes that, policy-makers went on building the monetary union by 
paying limited attention to academic views, largely because academic research could 
not keep up with the speed at which decisions were made. Another reason was that  
the adoption of a common currency was, first and foremost, a political project with  
political  imperatives.  In  particular,  the  whole  project  rested  on  Germany’s 
willingness  to  give  up  its  currency.  Having  accepted  to  share  a  currency  with  
countries whose monetary record was far from stellar, Germany’s request for formal 
and precise guarantees could not be turned down. Europe’s economic performance, 
especially  in  the  three  largest  euro-area  countries,  is  highly  disappointing.  Two 
decades of slow growth and stubbornly high unemployment have generated massive 
frustrations. Economists are steeped in the fine distinction between monetary and 
structural matters. The public at large, many politicians and policy-makers are not in 
agreement and, as the rejection of the draft constitution has shown, many are ready 
to blame Europe in general, and the monetary union in particular, for the hardship 
that they face. This is a very serious threat to European institutions. A transparent 
and accountable monetary union will not bring instant illumination, but it may help 
diffuse dangerous misunderstandings between citizens and Europe.
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Philip R. Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2007) have stressed that the growth 
in trade and financial linkages between Europe and the rest of the world means that  
the spillover impact of a contraction in the US deficit and Asian surpluses on Europe 
is now larger than 20 years ago. The scale of global integration in trade and finance 
remains  limited,  and  the  exposure  of  Europe  to  external  shocks  should  not  be 
overstated. However, with increasing levels of global economic integration, even the 
determination  of  domestically  orientated  policies  must  take  into  account 
international factors. Indeed, a major motivation for structural reforms is to boost the 
flexibility  of  European economies  so  as  to  improve  their  capacity  to  cope  with 
globalization and swings in the external environment. The exposure of Europe to the 
dollar, while non-negligible, is much smaller than the exposure of emerging Asia 
and Japan. 
A real  effective  depreciation  of  the  dollar  occurs  primarily  vis-à-vis  the  largest  
creditor  countries  and  regions  –emerging  Asia,  Japan,  and  oil  exporters–  the 
consequences for Europe in general, and the euro area in particular, would not be 
large. Clearly, the risks for Europe are much more significant if creditor country  
currencies, many of which closely track the US dollar, fail to adjust, so that at least  
in the short term a weakening of the dollar would imply a substantial real effective 
appreciation for Europe and the euro area. In turn, this could have strong negative 
repercussions on economic activity, underscoring the importance of policy measures 
that help sustain output and demand. 
While  there  is  substantial  variation  in  the  extent  of  trade  and financial  linkages 
between individual European countries and the United States and Asia, the scale of 
such linkages is  limited even for  the  most  exposed countries  (with  the  possible 
exception  of  Ireland).  If  this  shift  were  to  be  accompanied  by  a  less  benign 
international  financial  environment,  characterized  by  higher  spreads  on  debtor 
countries and less bountiful  capital  flows, some countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe may be forced to undergo a sharp adjustment in their external accounts.
In the work of Hodson Dermot (2010), the financial crisis got real for the euro-area, 
with falling investment and the slump in world trade weighing on the real economy 
and  causing  the  worst  recession  of  modern  times.  Thalassinos,  Liapis  and 
Thalassinos (2011) have analysed the regulation framework for the banking sector 
during the crisis pointing out the role of the rating companies in this development. 
The recession bore all the hallmarks of a symmetric shock with asymmetric effects, 
with all member states being affected, though some were paying a higher price than 
others for their exposure to global trade, toxic assets and bursting property bubbles. 
The response of euro-area authorities to these developments was predictable in some 
respects  and  surprising  in  others.  In  the  monetary  sphere,  the  European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) cautious response to interest rate cuts was true to form for a central 
bank with an overriding interest in price stability - although it moved fairly rapidly 
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once the inflationary pressures of 2008 subsided. The Bank proved less reticent than 
anticipated about embracing unconventional monetary policies, although its covered 
bond scheme to provide emergency credit to euro-area banks was modest in scale  
and less ambitious than the actions of other central banks. In the financial sphere, the 
blueprint of the de Larosière Report’s for the future of prudential supervision in the 
EU,  was  surprisingly  supranational,  calling  as  it  did  for  the  creation  of  new 
community  bodies  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  the  excessive  risk  taking  that 
precipitated the financial  crisis.  The member states’  response to these plans was 
predictably  intergovernmental,  seeking  as  it  did  to  limit  the  powers  of  the 
Community in general and the ECB in particular. In the fiscal sphere, the Stability 
and  Growth  Pact  proved  to  be  surprisingly  resilient  in  2009.  The  European 
Commission and Ecofin prosecuted all member states that posted budget deficits in 
excess of 3 per cent in spite of the exceptional nature of the crisis. Greece has been 
hit the hardest by these sanctions as EU authorities have sought, with limited success 
thus far, to reassure markets that a sovereign default is not inevitable. In the sphere 
of external relations, 2009 was a year in which EU Member states found their voice 
on the world stage. Although they did not always say the same thing, Member states 
did pursue their  collective interests,  driving the agenda that  led to the  landmark 
summit of the G20 in London and putting up a fairly united front at the summit 
itself. If the EU was the winner from this exercise, then the euro-area may have been 
the loser insofar as the Eurogroup President was effectively sidelined in the G20’s 
important discussions on the future of global governance.
Holger (2010) notes that unsustainable public debt low competitiveness and high 
current  account  deficits  are  major  problems  for  the  so-called  PIIGS  countries 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain). Thalassinos, Liapis and Thalassinos (2013) 
argued that  PIIGS have been affected strongly by the CRAs through their rating 
during  the  credit  crisis.  These  countries  experienced  consumer  price  and  wage 
inflation above the euro-area average in the first decade of the euro, basically fuelled 
by  buoyant  capital  inflows.  The  resulting  real  appreciation  against  low-inflation 
countries led to a deterioration in their competitiveness, but rigid labour markets  
now  prevent  a  quick  market-based  readjustment  of  real  wages  to  the  changed 
situation. Thus, both public expenditure cuts and structural labour market reforms 
are urgent to reduce the likelihood of a euro-area break-up.
Following  the  above,  our  article  is  focused  on  the  presentation  of  similarities 
between  EU  countries  according  to  fundamental  economic  variables,  like  bank 
sector health, taxation structure and performance, balance of payments, gross wage 
earnings and government debt and deficit.  The action —or lack of it— from the 
countries involved, have created the framework of present day crisis.
Our article starts in section 2 with a presentation of the European Union (EU) and 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). The timeline of EMU integration is showed 
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and the current situation is presented. In section 3, the method of analysis and the  
data used are discussed.  Section 4 presents the main figures related to European 
banking and the similarities  between individual  country banking sectors.  This  is  
followed by the structure of tax revenues in EU countries; the similarities between 
individual countries’ tax regime structure and burden on gross wage earnings; the 
performance of each country’s tax regime and the similarities between individual 
country  performance  in  section  5;  in  section  6,  the  EU intra  country  trade  and 
payments  and  the  similarities  between  individual  countries’  current  account  of 
balance  of  payment  are  produced;  section  7  presents  the  Government  debt  and 
budget  net  year  lending  (deficit),  as  well  as  similarities  between  individual 
countries’ Government debt and deficit. Using the above analysis, section 8 focuses 
on the similarities which are produced when following all the above components as 
criteria.  The EU and EMU seem to comprise  large clusters  of  countries  sharing 
common characteristics. 
According to the work of Peeters (2009, 2010, 2011), Schwarz (2007), Smith and 
Webb (2001), Munin (2011), and Navez (2012), the tax system applied in a country 
has  a  serious  impact  on  cross-country  competiveness,  something  that,  in  turn,  
impinges strongly on the actual economy of common markets such as the European 
Union (EU) and the differences among tax regimes diversifies homogeneity. From 
the other hand the mobility of productive factors is directly related with country tax-
regime differences, government budget funding from tax revenues and rates are the 
main fiscal policy tools. Thalassinos, Maditinos and Paschalidis (2012) have argued 
about  the  effect  of  the  insider  trading  in  the  stock  exchange  affecting  the 
performance of listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange.
We  argue  that  there  are  significant  differences  among  the  tax  regimes  of  EU 
countries and that no policy has been implemented to ensure tax homogeneity across 
the  EU,  nor  is  there  any likelihood of  such.  The anarchy in  fiscal  policy is  an  
obstacle for the European Integration. Budget deficits have an impact on taxation 
and countries, invariably, manage the recent debt crisis by selecting different taxes 
as fiscal policy tools.
Our  article  shows  that  the  type  and  the  level  of  economic  growth  affects  the 
structure of taxes at work and alters the performance of different types of taxes; is 
also  wishes  to  explain  the  factors  that  differentiate  tax  regimes  by  using  multi 
dimensional  criteria  and thus  contribute  to  the  debate  for  a  common tax regime 
between EU countries. It presents, also, the groups of EU countries with similar tax 
regimes and analyzes the characteristics of structure among applied tax regimes and 
thus contributes to debate which type of tax regime is more suitable as a common 
tax regime.
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According to Stuckler  et al.  (2010), taxing the rich is a policy based to increase 
taxes against the recent financial crisis and carries a considerable populist appeal (as 
many hold those involved with the bank system responsible for the crisis and believe 
they should pay its price, though this happened only in the case of Ireland and not in 
other PIIGS countries).
A key problem with the current debt crisis is public spending is increased less than 
decreased tax revenue. However, Wilkes (2009) argues that taxing bonuses and high 
incomes may stifle incentives for entrepreneurship and innovation. Enforcing a more 
progressive tax system is politically challenging in light of the lobbying strength of 
the  wealthy,  but  may most  directly  address  the  current  debt  crisis.  While  more 
progressive  taxation  is  a  less  viable  option  in  countries  with  already  highly 
progressive systems, like Sweden, there is scope for raising revenues in the UK, 
Greece and other EU countries. In fact, the current governments of EU countries  
have adopted a quite different approach, increasing VAT — a regressive indirect tax 
whose burden falls disproportionately on the poor.
There are also some simple, albeit politically difficult, changes that would bring the 
corporate taxation in line with other countries, to yield very large sums for continued 
government spending. In many countries, like Ireland, the economic development 
policy is based on a low corporate tax and, thus, it is difficult for this tax to be in 
line for all EU countries. Increasing taxes on alcohol, tobacco and sugary drinks  
further could represent viable revenue-generating options, benefiting both health and 
the economy. In the short run, these options may disproportionately hurt the poor 
(although  there  are  disputes  about  the  net  effect  on  their  overall  welfare),  and 
Keynesian economists worry that such taxes will diminish aggregate demand and 
slow down recovery. Thus, in Roosevelt’s New Deal, prohibition on alcohol was 
lifted  not  only  because  drinking  was  popular,  but  mainly  because  it  would 
reinvigorate consumer spending and increase tax revenues. The health costs of this 
aspect of New Deal policy (and, in turn, subsequent downstream costs) were never 
assessed. Further limitations include the scope for tax evasion due to imports from 
other EU countries, as well as smuggling of goods such as cigarettes, an activity in 
which  the  tobacco industry  has  been  complicit.  Another  option  is  the  proposed 
Tobin Tax, which would take a very small percentage of capital flows. This could 
generate significant revenue, but would require agreement and implementation by 
all major countries to be effective. Finally, the excessive use of taxes against crisis  
causes social dissatisfaction, and, especially in the case of Greece, nobody knows 
whether this policy is suitable and can bring the desired effects.
In our article the tax regimes of EU countries are analyzed in the following parts in 
order to present the current situation and to find the structure, the trends and the 
similarities  among  applied  tax  regimes.  Our  work,  also,  examines  the 
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implementation fair and unfair taxes and the adequacy of each countries tax system 
and legislation.
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2. The European Union (EU) and the European Monetary Union EMU
Based on the work of John H. Rogers (2007) and John Goddard et al. (2007), the 
present study will describe the environment established by the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the main accounting and other quantitative figures for the EU 
banking sector as follows:
European Monetary Union integration timeline
The European Monetary Union was established in 1957. The timeline for economic 
integration has progressed as follows:
1957 The Treaty of Rome establishes customs unions.
1970s An informal joint float of several European currencies is instituted versus the 
dollar (called “the snake”).
1979 The European Monetary System creates a formal network of mutually pegged 
exchange rates (France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg, and 
Netherlands).
1986 The Single European Act (“Europe 1992”) is established, which eventually 
facilitates the full development of the internal market, removing internal barriers 
to trade and to the movement of capital and labour.
1991 Specified convergence criteria for EMU admission are developed, along with 
calls for the harmonisation of social policy (“stage 2” to begin 1/94).
1991 Specified convergence criteria for EMU admission are developed, along with 
calls for the harmonisation of social policy (‘‘stage 2’’ to begin 1/94).
1989-92 Spain (1989), Britain (1990), Portugal (1992) join the EMS; Italy and Britain 
leave after the 9/92 crisis over the harmonisation of the value-added tax (VAT); 
the internal market is fully developed.
1997 The Stability & Growth Pact specifies medium-term budgetary objectives for 
the EMU.
1998 EMU members include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
1999 The Euro is launched along with a single monetary policy for the entire EMU 
(set by the ECB); all monetary policy actions and most large-denomination 
private payments are completed in Euros. National currencies are “irrevocably 
fixed” but continue to circulate for a 3-year transition period.
2001 Expansion of the EMU; Greece joins
2007 Expansion of the EMU; Slovenia joins
2008 Expansion of the EMU; Cyprus and Malta join
2009 Expansion of the EMU; Slovakia joins
2011 Expansion of the EMU; Estonia joins
The current situation 
Economic growth had resumed in most countries by the 4th quarter of 2009. The 
main exceptions were the Baltic States, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Most developing countries have experienced a return to pre-recession growth rates,  
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but  growth  rates  in  developed  countries  are  generally  below  trend,  and 
unemployment  rates continue  to  rise.  From January 2010 to  the  present,  twelve 
member states in the Eurozone have experienced public debt ratios higher than 60% 
of  GDP.  Particular  concern  developed  in  early  2010  regarding  the  fiscal 
sustainability of the economies of the PIIGS countries following rating downgrades 
by  the  credit  rating  agencies and a  dramatically  increase  of  spreads  and  Credit 
Default  Swaps  (CDS)  of  their  government’s  bond.  In  May  2010,  the  Eurozone 
governments  and  the  IMF made  €110  billion  available  to  Greece.  Also,  the 
Eurozone  launched  its  €600bn  European  Financial  Stability  Facility  during  that 
period, and the European Central Bank launched its Securities Markets Program. In 
November 2010, an agreement was reached regarding an EU/IMF Ireland rescue 
package  of  €90 billion  for  Ireland.  Beginning  in  December  2010,  the  European 
Central  Bank  bought  Portuguese  and  Irish  bonds.  In  April  2011,  Portugal  was 
integrated into the European Financial Stability Facility with a rescue package of 
approximately €80 billion. Nowadays the above amount for the financial stability of 
Greece proves to be unrealistic and a new round of discussions has started. 
3. The method of our analysis and the data.
The method
The aim of our study is to present similarities among EU countries, thus we gathered 
a  collection  of  samples,  for  critical  economic  variables,  in  order  to  group  the 
samples into homogeneous groups of EU countries. The most suitable method for 
our analysis is the Single sample case and Multi sample case of Cluster analysis 
(Mardia et al., 1979). In our analysis, we used the Multi sample problem of Cluster 
analysis:
Let   , be the observation in the jth samples, j=1, 2,…,m. 
The aim of cluster analysis is to group the m samples into g homogeneous classes 
where g is unknown, g ≤ m.
The clustering methods are optimization partitioning techniques since the clusters 
are  formed by  optimizing  a  clustering  criterion.  According  to  these  hierarchical  
methods,  once  an  object  is  allocated  to  a  group,  it  cannot  be  reallocated  as  g 
decreases, unlike the optimization techniques. The end product of these techniques 
is a tree diagram (Dendrogram). 
In  our  study,  we  used  the  max  similarities  within  groups  and  min  similarities  
between groups as hierarchal methods.   
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These techniques operate on a matrix of distances   between the points 
 rather than the points themselves. 
We used two choices for the distant matrix:
Euclidian distance  (1)
Where X be an (n x p) data matrix
Karl Pearson distance  (2)
Where:  is the variance of kth’s variable.
The data matrix
The sources of our data are: ECB Structural indicators for the EU banking sector 
January 2010 and Key tables from OECD 2010. The EU countries used are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany Greece Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. Cases j=15. The variables which are 
used  for  the  production  of  similarities  between  countries  are  separated  in  the 
following components:
For the Banking Sector, the variables Number of Banks, Assets of Banks, Branches 
of Banks, and Employees, for the years 1985, 1995, 2004, 2008 and the variable of  
Economic Leverage which is defined as Bank’s Assets to GDP for the year 2008.  
For Tax regime structure and burden, tax revenues from income, profits and capital  
gains, Revenues to cover the charges for social security, Property tax and Taxes on 
goods and services; also, for the burden of taxation, the variables – indexes income 
tax and for social security on the Gross wage earnings, and Gross wage earnings per 
EU country. Tax regime performance: the variables – indexes, taxes to GDP, for 
total revenue of taxes, property tax, corporate tax, taxes on personal income, taxes 
on goods and services, social security and for the years 2002 to 2009. EU countries’ 
intra  trade  and  payments:  the  variable  –  index,  Current  Account  of  Balance  of 
Payments to GDP and for the years 2002 to 2008. Government debt and deficit: the 
variable – index, Government debt and budget net year lending (deficit) to GDP and 
Gross Domestic Product and for the years 2002 to 2009. Variables p=72. 
4. The main figures related to European banking: similarities between
 individual countries’ banking sector
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The evolution of the key financial figures for the European banking industry from 
2005  to  2008  is  presented  in  Table  1.  Observations  crucial  to  our  analysis  are 
immediately evident from Table 1:
a. The assets in the European banking sector seriously expanded during this time. 
b. During the period from 2004 to 2008, bank assets expanded significantly in 
Spain (123%), Greece (101%) and Ireland (96%). 
c. Regarding Greece, it should be noted that the increase in bank assets was 
mainly due to their expansion into Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. For that 
reason, private debt has remained quite low.
d. The number of banks and the number of branches has remained considerably 
stable. 
e. The total number of employees in the European banking sector has remained 
stable, denoting a remarkable increase in productivity.
The data for Dendrogram 1 indicate the similarities between the banking sectors of 
several European countries based on hierarchical cluster analysis using all available 
methods, including Pearson correlation and Euclidian distances. 
Dendrogram 1: Similarities among countries using the Banking Figures 1985 -2008
The  main  conclusions  according  to  the  resulting  Dendrogram  (Karl  Pearson 
Correlation method, average linkage between groups) are as follows:
a. There  are  two  large  groups,  one  comprising  large  countries  like  France, 
Germany,  the  UK,  Italy,  and  Spain  plus  Luxembourg,  and  another  group 
comprising all other countries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. 
b. Ireland remains in an uncertain position; based on the within-group analysis, it  
belongs to the first group, but based on the between-groups analysis, it belongs 
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to the second.
c. The subgroup within the first group includes France, the UK, Italy and Spain,  
whereas Luxembourg and Germany stand alone. 
d. There are three subgroups within the second group: the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Denmark; Austria and Sweden; Greece and Portugal. Finland stands alone.
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Table 1: Timeline of main figures for the banking industries in the first 15 EU Countries (1985-2008)
                       Number of banks                             Assets (billion euro)               Number of branches Employees (’000s)
Country 1985 1995 2004 2008 1985 1995 2004 2008 1985 1995 2004 2008 1985 1995 2004 2008
EMU countries
Austria 1406 1041 796 803 – – 635 1068 – – 4360 4243 – – 73 79
Belgium 120 143 104 105 286 589 914 1272 8207 7668 4837 4316 71 77 71 65
Denmark 259 202 202 171 96 126 607 1092 3411 2215 2021 2192 52 47 44 53
Finland  498 381 364 357 – – 212 384 – 1612 1585 1672 – 31 25 26
France 1952 1469 897 728 1349 2514 4415 7225 25,782 26,606 26,370 39,634 449 408 425 492
Germany 4739 3785 2148 1989 1495 3584 6584 7875 39,925 44,012 45,505 39,531 591 724 712 686
Greece  41 53 62 66 69 94 230  462 1815 2417 3403 4095 27 54 59 66
Ireland  42 56 80 501 21 46 722 1412 – 808 909  895 – –  36 41
Italy 1101 970 801 818 547 1070 2276 3628 13,033 20,839 30,946 34,139 319 337  337  340
Luxemb.  177  220 169 152 170 445 695 932 120 224 253 229 10 19 23 27
Netherl.    178 102 461 302 227 650 1678 2235 6868 6729 3649 3421 92  111 115 116
Portugal 226  233  200 175 38 116 345  482 1494 3401 5408 6391 59 60 53 62
Spain 364 506 346 362 311 696 1717 3831 32,503 36,405 40,621 46,065 244 249  246 276
Other EU countries
Sweden 598 249 222 182 – – 583 900 – – 2018 2025 – –  39  50
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UK 772 564 413 391 1294 2000 6970 8840 2,224 17,522 13,386 12,514 350  383 511 496 
Sources: ECB Structural indicators for the EU banking sector January 2010, 
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Table 2: Year 2008 bank’s assets to GDP
European Country Economic Leverage
 Austria  450
 Belgium  451
 Denmark  705
 Finland 268
 France  461
 Germany 361
 Greece  191
 Ireland 1043
 Italy  255
 Luxembourg  2979
 Netherlands 444
 Portugal 255
 Spain  355
 Sweden  346
 UK  547
Source: OECD, ECB (2010)
The ratio of a quasi economic leverage for the banking sector could be measured by 
the formula:
According to the estimations for the above index for each EU country, the lowest 
value occurs for Greece and the biggest value occurs for Ireland. Luxembourg is a 
financial  centre  for  EU  countries.  The  above  index  has  to  be  examined  in 
comparison with government debt index as a total index of debt for an economy. 
Taking into account the above mentioned for the Greek economy, we argue that the 
private debt is minimal or the private sector of the economy is very small. Two other 
countries,  Italy and Portugal,  have very small  index prices.  Economies  with big 
prices  in  the  above  index,  like  Ireland,  Denmark  and  Luxemburg,  are  more 
vulnerable to financial crises. To the exception of Ireland, the other PIIGS countries 
don’t have any significant problems as a result of credit expansion in their Banks.  
These matters give the opportunity in these countries to finance their private sector, 
after  a  serious  increase  of  their  bank’s  capital,  in  order  to  aid  economic 
development, which is necessary under the recent crisis. This ratio is used from our 
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study  as  the  first  component  towards  finding  the  total  similarity  between  EU 
countries and to surveying suitable policies against crisis.    
5. The structure of tax revenues in EU countries; similarities 
among individual countries’ tax regime structure and burden.  
The tax regime of any EU country is the other part of our research. Using OECD 
data, we first examined the similarities between countries using the structure of tax 
revenues. The tax revenues are analysed in four categories; firstly revenues from 
income, profits and capital gains, secondly revenues to cover the charges for social  
security, thirdly revenues from property tax and finally the indirect taxes which are 
charged on goods and services.
Table  3  presents  the  structure  of  tax  revenues  in  EU  countries  for  2009.  The 
countries with less and greater involvement in any tax revenue are,  respectively,  
France and Denmark, for tax on income, profits and capital gains; Denmark and 
Spain for revenues to cover charges for social security; Austria and UK for property 
tax; finally Portugal and Spain for indirect taxes. Using the Karl Pearson Correlation 
Test  and  average  linkage  within  groups,  Dendrogram 2  presents  the  clusters  of 
similarities between countries using the structure of tax revenues. Notable groups of 
countries are: first Belgium and Italy, Greece and Portugal, Germany and Austria,  
Finland and Sweden. The other countries are left alone.   
Table 3: Year 2009: the structure of tax revenues in EU countries 
European Country 
Income, profits, 
capital gains
Social
security
Prope
rty
Goods and
services
 Austria  27,93 34,89 1,27 28,07
 Belgium  35,91 33,39 4,72 25,17
 Denmark  61,30 2,05 3,93 31,86
 Finland 35,90 29,79 2,58 31,44
 France  20,75 39,25 8,15 24,94
 Germany 28,82 38,80 2,29 29,65
 Greece  25,11 34,07 4,55 35,91
 Ireland 35,80 19,79 8,22 34,94
 Italy  32,57 31,77 6,22 24,38
 Luxembourg  35,29 30,10 6,61 27,76
 Netherlands - - - -
 Portugal 26,32 32,74 3,63 36,60
 Spain  29,98 39,44 6,36 23,27
 Sweden  35,15 24,44 2,35 29,09
 UK  38,45 19,74 12,32 28,99
Source: OECD (2010), statistics, and authors calculations
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Dendrogram 2: Similarities among countries using the structure of tax revenues
We then examined the burden of taxation on income tax and for social security on 
the Gross wage earnings per EU countries. Table 4 presents, for 2009, the burden of  
taxation and the gross wage earnings per EU countries. Using Euclidian Distance 
and  average  linkage  between  groups,  Dendrogram  3  shows  the  clusters  of 
similarities between countries using the burden of taxation and gross wage earnings.  
Notable groups of countries are: first Belgium and Ireland, Greece and France, Spain 
and Italy, Finland and Sweden, Austria and Denmark. The remaining countries stand 
alone. The lower gross wage is in Portugal and the higher in Netherlands. 
Table 4: Year 2009: The burden of taxation and the gross wage earnings per EU countries 
European 
Country
Total payment % 
Gross Wage 
Earnings
Income tax % 
Gross Wage 
Earnings
Social security 
contributions % 
Gross Wage 
Earnings
Gross 
wage 
earnings
 Austria  32,75 14,69 18,06 44.881,10
 Belgium  41,51 27,54 13,98 43.556,69
 Denmark  39,37 29,09 10,28 44.439,01
 Finland 29,17 22,86 6,31 39.582,08
 France  27,74 14,04 13,70 36.068,14
 Germany 41,32 20,70 20,63 47.882,21
 Greece  25,07 9,07 16,00 33.994,29
 Ireland 20,90 14,24 6,67 42.461,22
 Italy  29,33 19,84 9,49 30.807,82
 Luxembourg  26,37 14,16 12,21 52.320,62
 Netherlands 31,76 16,59 15,17 51.336,15
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 Portugal 22,28 11,28 11,00 24.921,03
 Spain  19,68 13,33 6,35 31.856,10
 Sweden  25,31 18,30 7,01 38.160,92
 UK  25,30 16,16 9,14 51.018,21
Source: OECD (2010), Statistics, and authors calculations
Dendrogram 3: Similarities among countries using the burden of taxation and gross wage earnings
A major question emerges regarding the performance of any taxation as a percentage 
of each country’s GDP. Table 5 presents total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP 
for EU countries. The countries with less and greater involvement in tax revenue 
are,  respectively,  Ireland  and  Denmark.  Using  Euclidian  Distance  and  average 
linkage between groups, Dendrogram 4 presents the cluster of similarities between 
countries using performance of each tax as mentioned in part 3 (for example Income 
tax, Property tax etc.), and for years 2002 to 2009, as % of GDP- in order to take 
into account the volatility of performance. Notable groups of countries are: Spain 
and  Ireland,  Greece  and  Portugal,  Austria  and  Italy,  Finland  and  Sweden  and 
Belgium, Germany and Netherlands. The remaining countries stand alone.  
Table 5: The total tax revenue as percentage of GDP 
European Country  Total Tax 2008 
 Austria                42,70   
 Belgium                44,16   
 Denmark                48,18   
 Finland               43,13   
 France                43,18   
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 Germany               36,97   
 Greece                32,57   
 Ireland               28,76   
 Italy                43,27   
 Luxembourg                35,55   
 Netherlands               39,09   
 Portugal               35,25   
 Spain                33,26   
 Sweden                46,30   
 UK                35,67   
Source: OECD (2010),
Dendrogram 4: Similarities among countries using performance of each tax as % of GDP
According to Stuckler  et al. (2010), taxing the rich is a policy based to increase 
taxes against the recent financial crisis and carries a considerable populist appeal (as 
many hold those involved with the bank system responsible for the crisis and believe 
they should pay its price, though this happened only in the case of Ireland and not in 
other PIIGS countries).
A key problem with the current debt crisis is public spending is increased less than 
decreased tax revenue. However, Wilkes G. (2009) argues that taxing bonuses and 
high incomes may stifle incentives for entrepreneurship and innovation. Enforcing a 
more  progressive  tax  system  is  politically  challenging  in  light  of  the  lobbying 
strength of the wealthy, but may most directly address the current debt crisis. While 
more progressive taxation is a less viable option in countries with already highly 
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progressive systems, like Sweden, there is scope for raising revenues in the UK, 
Greece and other EU countries. In fact, the current governments of EU countries  
have adopted a quite different approach, increasing VAT  ̶a regressive indirect tax 
whose burden falls disproportionately on the poor.
There are also some simple, albeit politically difficult, changes that would bring the 
corporate taxation in line with other countries, to yield very large sums for continued 
government spending. In many countries, like Ireland, the economic development 
policy is based on a low corporate tax and, thus, it is difficult for this tax to be in 
line for all EU countries. Increasing taxes on alcohol, tobacco and sugary drinks  
further could represent viable revenue-generating options, benefiting both health and 
the economy. In the short run, these options may disproportionately hurt the poor 
(although  there  are  disputes  about  the  net  effect  on  their  overall  welfare),  and 
Keynesian economists worry that such taxes will diminish aggregate demand and 
slow down recovery. Thus, in Roosevelt’s New Deal, prohibition on alcohol was 
lifted  not  only  because  drinking  was  popular,  but  mainly  because  it  would 
reinvigorate consumer spending and increase tax revenues. The health costs of this 
aspect of New Deal policy (and, in turn, subsequent downstream costs) were never 
assessed. Further limitations include the scope for tax evasion due to imports from 
other EU countries, as well as smuggling of goods such as cigarettes, an activity in 
which  the  tobacco industry  has  been  complicit.  Another  option  is  the  proposed 
Tobin Tax, which would take a very small percentage of capital flows. This could 
generate significant revenue, but would require agreement and implementation by 
all major countries to be effective. Finally, the excessive use of taxes against crisis  
causes social dissatisfaction, and, especially in the case of Greece, nobody knows 
whether this policy is suitable and can bring the desired effects.   
6. EU countries’ intra trade and payments; similarities among 
individual countries’ current account of balance of payment. 
A major question relates to the international and intra trade and payments of each 
EU country. Table 6 presents the movements in deficit or surplus of EU countries’ 
current account of balance of payment as percentage of GDP of each country and for 
the years 2001, 2004, 2008. The countries that have significant growth of surplus 
from 2001 to 2008 are, for EMU, Germany (from 0 to +6.66) and Austria (from 
-0.80  to  +3.18).  Sweden (an  EU though not  an-EMU state)  shows a  significant 
increase of surplus from 3.79 to 9.79, while Finland has a significant decrease of 
surplus  from 8,58 to  3,01.  All  PIIGS countries  have significant  deficit  increase. 
Using Karl Pearson correlation and average linkage between groups, Dendrogram 5 
presents the cluster of similarities between countries using the current account of 
balance of payments for the period 2001-2008, as % of GDP, in order to take into 
account  the  volatility  till  time.  There are  two large groups of  countries;  one for 
Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Netherlands, and another one for all other countries. 
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In the second group there are subgroups of countries: one group is consisting of 
France, Italy, and Finland, one group is consisting of Spain, Ireland and Greece and 
another group is consisting of Portugal, and Belgium.
Table 6: The movements in EU countries’ current account of balance of payment
European Country 2001 2004 2008 
 Austria  -                      0,80                          2,23                          3,18   
 Belgium                         3,40                          3,49   -                      2,53   
 Denmark                         2,56                          2,35                          2,19   
 Finland                        8,58                          6,56                          3,01   
 France                         1,95                          0,61   -                      2,25   
 Germany                        0,01                          4,67                          6,66   
 Greece  -                      7,27   -                      5,87   -                    14,53   
 Ireland -                      0,66   -                      0,58   -                      5,33   
 Italy  -                      0,06   -                      0,94   -                      3,40   
 Luxembourg                         8,76                        11,86                          5,45   
 Netherlands                        2,44                          7,52                          4,78   
 Portugal -                      9,91   -                      7,58   -                    12,09   
 Spain  -                      3,94   -                      5,25   -                      9,57   
 Sweden                         3,79                          6,75                          9,79   
 UK  -                      2,07   -                      2,07   -                      1,63   
Dendrogram 5: Similarities among countries using current account of balance of payment
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The intra-European trade is the lion’s share of total international transactions for 
European countries according to Lane et al., (2007). The level of direct trade with 
the United States and East Asia is relatively low, approximately 10% respectively in 
most cases- with the main exception being the high level of trade between Ireland 
and the  United States.  In  addition,  the  United  States  and East  Asia  are  broadly 
similar in importance as trading partners for most European countries (although, of  
course, the sectoral composition of trade is likely to be very different across these  
two  regions).  Accordingly,  the  direct  impact  of  a  slowdown  (or  a  switch  in 
expenditures  away  from  imports  towards  domestically  produced  goods)  in  the 
United States on individual European countries through the trade channel is limited 
in magnitude. Moreover, redistribution in spending from the United States to East 
Asia (as in benign adjustment scenarios) would have a roughly neutral aggregate 
impact, with rising trade with East Asia compensating for a decline in trade with the 
United States. However, the scale of direct trade is an incomplete measure, since 
European firms may compete with American firms for market  share in common 
third markets. For this reason, it is also informative to take into account such third-
country effects in quantifying the importance of the trade channel. The trade channel  
is only of limited importance for most European countries – however, it poses a  
particular  vulnerability  for  Ireland and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  United  Kingdom. 
Moreover, scenarios in which contraction and/or depreciation in the United States is 
offset  by  expansion  and/or  appreciation  in  Asia  represents  a  broadly  neutral 
aggregate trade environment for most European countries. Germany was the winner 
from all other countries of Eurozone in intra-trade. The deficits in current account of 
balance of payments from all others EU countries are covered from the surplus of 
Germany in the year 2009. Using a hard currency, the Euro, which is not acceptable  
yet for international trade, had imported raw materials at low cost,  increased the 
productivity of labor, with cut costing policies and used basically the internal EU 
market for exports, often opaque trade policies (Siemens) was the most beneficial.
7. Government debt and budget net year lending (deficit); similarities 
among individual countries’ government debt and deficit. 
In this part  we present  government debt and budget  net  year lending (deficit)  in 
order to produce the similarities among EU countries’ Government debt and deficit. 
Table 7 presents government debt, deficit as percentage of GDP and GDP for 2009. 
All countries have budget net year lending (deficit) - significant amounts exist for 
PIIGS  countries,  France  and  UK.  Using  Karl  Pearson  correlation  and  average 
linkage between groups, Dendrogram 6 presents the cluster of similarities between 
countries using the government debt and deficit for the years 2009 as % of GDP.  
Two groups of countries stand out: one group is consisting of Italy, Greece and 
Belgium and the other one is consisting of the other companies.
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Table 7: The government debt, deficit and GDP
European Country  Gov. Debt 2009  Deficit 2009  GDP in b$ 2009 
 Austria                   64,31   -           4,15                  324,68   
 Belgium                   95,29   -           5,98                  391,77   
 Denmark                   37,81   -           2,81                  208,11   
 Finland                  37,60   -           2,88                  188,13   
 France                   60,79   -           7,50               2.173,32   
 Germany                  43,77   -           3,03               2.975,33   
 Greece                 125,70   -         15,59                  330,70   
 Ireland                  45,95   -         14,27                  176,81   
 Italy                 106,55   -           5,31               1.951,47   
 Luxembourg                     8,56   -           0,91                    42,20   
 Netherlands                  49,87   -           5,46                  674,52   
 Portugal                  81,14   -         10,12                  266,49   
 Spain                   46,14   -         11,13               1.481,41   
 Sweden                   37,84   -           0,95                  345,58   
 UK                   75,06   -         10,84               2.172,53   
Dendrogram 6: Similarities among countries using the government debt, deficit
A question that emerges has to do with the way a country can reduce government 
debt and deficits. A measure to reduce deficits and government’s debt is the sale of 
government assets (i.e. privatization) according to the study of Stuckler et al. (2010), 
though this is not without risk; governments may fail  to recoup their assets in a 
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depressed market.  Russia’s rapid privatization programmes sold assets at a small  
fraction of their actual value. In one of the worst examples, an oil company with  
assets worth $8000 million was auctioned for $101 million. However, Britain has 
experience with case-by-case sales of assets, and has begun selling assets to raise 
£16 billion, with more on the way, such as the Channel Tunnel rail link and the 
National  Air  Traffic  Control  Service.  It  is  important  to get  the timing right;  the 
Swedish government made a substantial profit when it resold ailing banks that had 
been partially nationalized in the early 1990s in response to a banking crisis and the 
British government is already sitting on profits of many billions of pounds as a result 
of its investments in part-nationalized British banks. 
Governments  can  alternatively  stimulate  the  economy  by  increasing  the  money 
supply  because,  when  a  country  faces  the  risk  of  deflation,  demand reduces  as 
people  wait  for  prices  to  fall.  Governments  have,  however,  been  anxious  about 
doing this since Germany’s experience in the inter-war years, when printing money 
to  pay  war  debts  led  to  spiraling  inflation  and  ultimately  World  War  II.  This 
sequence of events is now recognized as an extreme case, and many economists 
argue that inflation does not impede growth as long as it does not rise above about 
8–10%,  leading  to  “hyper-inflation”.  The  options  are,  however,  limited  because 
when  interest  rates  are  already close  to  zero,  it  is  not  possible  to  stimulate  the 
economy by cutting such rates further. Instead, central banks increase the supply of 
money to financial  institutions to encourage them to lend even greater  sums (an 
approach known as ‘quantitative easing’, especially relevant when there is risk of 
deflation which could lead consumers to save in anticipation of further price drops).  
Thus this  measure has been employed by the Bank of  England,  the US Federal 
Reserve  and  the  European  Central  Bank,  although  there  is  now  considerable 
pressure for further structural reform of the British banking sector to ensure that the 
money is  lent  to businesses.  Although primarily intended to increase the money 
supply, quantitative easing will tend to increase inflation and thus reduce the value 
of debt held in the national currency (but simultaneously put pressure on interest  
rates to rise).
Another  option  is  to  borrow  more  money.  Most  governments  have  taken  this 
approach, issuing long-term government bonds. The rationale is that the resulting 
investment helps countries to grow out of debt, as long as the economy grows faster  
than interest rates (which are currently at record lows).
Another option is to cut public spending. This was done in Japan in the 1990s, but  
backfired,  since removed money from the economy just  at  a time when a fiscal  
stimulus was needed, resulting in a further loss of revenue. The implications for  
public health may be considerable; those calling for public spending cuts focus not 
only on the bank bailouts that caused the problem but rather also on public services.  
Such cuts are likely to impact on those without means to buffer themselves from 
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economic shocks, and who are least likely to live in the marginal constituencies that  
are crucial for a party to win power under the first-past-the-post political system. 
They effectively redistribute resources from the poor to the wealthy and there is now 
clear evidence from historical data that lower spending on social welfare costs lives.
Another option is to increase taxes as mentioned in the corresponding section. 
Another option is to increase competitiveness. Competitive economies will be able 
to reduce high public debt burden in the future. The recent Greek tragedy highlights  
the need for more labour market flexibility within the euro area according to Holger 
(2010).  After  several  waves  of  crises,  fiscal  consolidation  in  most  European 
countries  is  urgent.  Rigid  labour  markets  are  a  pivotal  obstacle  for  a  quick 
adjustment of competitiveness. Thus, reforms towards more flexible labour markets 
should  be  implemented  as  soon  as  possible  in  euro-area  countries.  Announced 
austerity measures in Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal that basically affect the  
public sector are a step to the right direction but need to be supported by a reduction 
of employment protection legislation, reduction or elimination of minimum wages 
(explicit  and  implicit)  and  by  a  decentralized  wage-bargaining  process.  The 
adjustment process will be painful, but it is a necessary prerequisite for a sustained 
economic recovery and less long-term unemployment. The alternative would be a 
long-lasting period of sluggish growth and high unemployment as experienced by 
Germany after  reunification.  This scenario neither calls  for further steps towards 
political  union  nor  for  a  co-ordination  or  centralization  of  wage  policies  at  a 
supranational level – though deregulation should also take place at central EU level.  
It clarifies that European government should address intra-euro area imbalances by 
labour market reforms and fiscal consolidation. A political union which turns into a  
transfer  union would be counter-productive as disparities in  competitiveness  and 
imbalances  in  current  accounts  would  tend  to  grow as  much  as  the  volume  of 
transfers allowed.  This would cause political discontent in parts  of  the European 
Union. Hence, to safeguard the European integration process, we should leave the 
adjustment of intra-euro area imbalances to markets (again) and put the emphasis of 
our political efforts on shaping incentives to enact structural reforms.
8. Conclusions; similarities among individual EU countries and 
the future of EMU
Using Euclidian Distance and average linkage between groups,  is  produced  the 
cluster of similarities between countries using criteria from above mentioned fields 
of economy like government debt and deficit, total tax revenues, and Bank’s Assets 
all these variables as % of GDP, and gross wage earnings per country in Euro. These 
similarities are presented in Dendrogram 7.
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Dendrogram 7: Similarities among EU countries
EU  countries  are  separated  in  2  groups.  The  first  group  is  consisting  of  two 
subgroups,  including  the  Netherlands,  UK,  Luxembourg  and  Germany, 
characterized by developed financial sector with balanced fiscal policy. The second 
subgroup is consisting of two subgroups: one subgroup is consisting of Finland and 
Sweden  and  the  other  one  is  consisting  of  Austria  and  Denmark.  Finally  the 
countries which are faced several financial or debt problems, Belgium and Ireland 
are  connected  with  second group.  The  second  large  group consists  of  Southern 
European  countries,  such  as  Italy,  Spain,  France,  Greece  and  Portugal,  and  is 
characterized by high deficit and high government debt, low gross wage revenues 
and low Bank’s Assets to GDP, low or medium total taxations performance, and 
decreases or deficits of current account of balance of payments.
The differences and the imbalances among EU countries reflect different national 
economic legislation and fiscal policies like: imbalances in mobility of productive 
factors,  differentiations  in  the  current  account  of  balance  of  payments,  different 
levels of expand in loans and advances or in use of financial or credit products. This 
problem seems to have also a  spatial  character  and will  pose a  serious  regional 
problem for the EU, and especially EMU countries, which already have a common 
currency and monetary policy.
According to our analysis, Italy and Spain, France and Greece and Portugal, all of 
them countries in the South Europe, are faced with crisis or will face the crisis in the  
near future. The problems of Ireland and Belgium are quite different from those of 
the southern countries. Evidence from our study is that sub unions inside the EU 
have been created with common characteristics.  
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Policies which are mentioned above to reduce the government debt of the Eurozone 
will lead to social discontent, and ultimately the collapse of the European Union.  
The only policy that seems to be efficient is full integration of the countries with a 
common fiscal and federal face and legislated solidarity.
The existing debt crisis must be faced with the following ways: The first measure 
are  to  be  substituted  every  countries  government  debt  form a  common debt  of 
Eurozone with long term perpetual Eurobonds under the management of a federal 
bank of ECB, in order to cut financing cost. The ECB have to, also, take actions in 
secondary market of bonds in order to equalizing the imbalances of spreads. The 
second measure is to minimize the net budget lending with policies to cut public 
spending. The policy of privatizations is a short measure and will be helpful, not  
from the direct  receipt  of  funds,  but  if used to start  up investments with capital  
movements  which  will  aid  economic  development  (by  increasing  GDP  and 
decreasing  the  unemployment).  A  common  tax  regime  for  all  EU  countries 
eliminates imbalances and allows mobility of capital and labor. Finally, the recent 
crisis is clearly a regional problem of the Eurozone and only regional policies are 
suitable solutions to it.
Without the implementation of EU policies to synchronize indicators variables such 
as those mentioned above, the common currency, and the EU, will be abandoned in 
the nearest future as countries across Europe will be compelled to return back to 
their national currencies and monetary and fiscal economic policies. 
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